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The Establishment Clause and Religion-
Based Categories: Taking
Entanglement Seriously
By BRUCE NEVIN SHORTT*
Introduction
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment' was first ap-
plied to the states in Everson v. Board of Education.2 Since then its
interpretation has been a vexing problem of constitutional jurispru-
dence. Today, Establishment Clause doctrine requires that an enact-
ment have a secular purpose and effect and that it not create excessive
entanglement between church and state.
3
Twenty years ago, when current doctrine was still in its formative
stages, Professor Philip Kurland offered the following formulation to
guide the application of the religion clauses:
The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a
single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a stan-
dard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as
they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either
to confer a benefit or to impose a burden.'
Clearly, his was not the path taken by the Supreme Court.5
Although many might agree with Professor Kurland's more recent
judgment that the current test and its predecessors have resulted in "ad
hoc judgments to which no principle seems applicable,"6 it is unlikely
* B.A., 1974, Amherst College; J.D., 1980, Harvard University; Ph.D candidate (phi-
losophy), Stanford University. The author would like to express his appreciation to the
Institute for Humane Studies for its support of this project in its early stages, and to William
Andrews of Harvard Law School for his encouragement and stimulating comments on an
earlier draft.
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
2. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
3. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
4. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 112 (1962).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 12-39.
6. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 23 (1978). Kurland is not alone in
criticizing the Court's decisions in this area for their lack of even a semblance of a rationale.
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that the present three-part Establishment Clause test and free exercise
doctrine will be swept aside for his proposal. This is not to say, how-
ever, that present Establishment Clause doctrine cannot accommodate
a requirement of facial neutrality.
In Walz v. Tax Commission,7 the Supreme Court upheld a prop-
erty tax exemption' specifically granted to religious organizations
against a challenge based on the Establishment Clause. Some com-
mentators have suggested that Walz should be read as indicating that
the Court will not hold tax exemptions expressly given to religious or-
ganizations to be unconstitutional per se.9 Walz is doctrinally signifi-
cant, however, because there the Court introduced "excessive
entanglements" language into Establishment Clause doctrine. In this
article, I shall argue that (1) because the "excessive entanglements" is-
sue was not assessed qualitatively, it was decided incorrectly in Walz,
and (2) if "entanglement" is measured qualitatively, specific grants of
tax exemption for religious organizations, and all religion-based classi-
fications, are unconstitutional per se under the Establishment Clause.
See, e.g., Schotten, The Establishment Clause and Excessive Governmental-Religious Entan-
glement: The Constitutional Status of Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools,
15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 207, 248-49 (1979). See also Serritella, Tangling with Entangle-
ment- Toward a Constitutional Evaluation of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 143 (1981). Even the Court has come close to admitting that there is little that unifies
its decisions in this area. Writing for the majority in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977),
Justice Blackmun states: "We have acknowledged before, and we do so again here, that the
wall of separation that must be maintained between church and state 'is a blurred, indistinct,
and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."' Id at
236. Justice Powell also writes, "Our decisions in this troubling area draw lines that often
must seem arbitrary." Id at 262 (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part). The Court's most recent admission of its uneasiness about
the state of Establishment Clause doctrine is found in Justice White's opinion for the major-
ity in Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980): "But Establish-
ment Clause cases are not easy;. . . we are divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the
different views on this subject of the people of this country. What is certain is that our
decisions have tended to avoid categorical imperatives and absolutist approaches at either
end of the range of possible outcomes. This course sacrifices clarity and predictability for
flexibility, but this promises to be the case until the continuing interaction between the
courts and the States... produces a single, more encompassing construction of the Estab-
lishment Clause."
7. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
8. This exemption was granted under New York law by N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW
§ 420 1 (McKinney 1960), as authorized by N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. For a survey of the
range of exemptions granted to religious organizations by the states, see C. ANTIEAU, P.
CARROLL & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS 123-69 (1965).
Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412 (1972), raised a similar issue. But
since the Florida legislature changed the relevant statute during the pendency of the case,
the Supreme Court dismissed Diffender.er as moot.
9. See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Aspects of Church Taxation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PRODS. 646, 662 (1973).
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This examination of establishment doctrine will focus on religion-
based classifications within the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). Such
classifications have proliferated in the IRC over the last thirty years.
While religion-based classifications appear in other areas of the law,'0
the Establishment Clause problems raised by such classifications can
most easily be illustrated in connection with the IRC. The actual and
potential controversy in this area usually concerns the scope of the clas-
sifications, including such questions as what organizations and activi-
ties are governed by their provisions. This contrasts with the more
frequently litigated Establishment Clause questions concerning the per-
missible extent of public aid to parochial schools and their students, in
which the religious affiliation of the school is not typically at issue."
I. The Development of the Establishment Clause Doctrine and
the Entanglement Test
A. The Establishment Clause Doctrine
In its early years, the Supreme Court took the position that it did
not have the authority to intervene in disputes over religious liberties
between citizens and the states. As a result, the religion clauses of the
First Amendment lay virtually dormant for almost ninety years after
the ratification of the Bill of Rights. Justice Catron expressed the dom-
inant judicial attitude on this point in Permoli v. First Munic~pality,'2 in
which he wrote, "The Constitution makes no provision for protecting
the citizens of the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left
to the state constitutions and laws. . . .,113
The Free Exercise Clause was the first of the religion clauses to be
10. See, for example, Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 759, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 604,
612-13, which granted conscientious objector status only to those whose opposition to war
was grounded in religious training. Subsequent versions of the conscientious objector ex-
emption retained similar language. Section 634.5 of the California Unemployment Insur-
ance Code excludes from its definition of "employment" service performed in the employ of
"a church or convention or association of churches" or "an organization which is operated
primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally
supported by a church or convention or association of churches." CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE
§ 634.5 (West Supp. 1972). Section 2(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (1976), has been interpreted as not giving jurisdiction to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board over church-operated schools. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S.
490, 499-507 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
12. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588 (1845).
13. Id at 609. For another early discussion of the church-state relationship, see Vidal
v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844).
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interpreted by the Supreme Court.' 4 A few years later the Court de-
cided in Davis v. Beason 15 that neither religion clause provided grounds
for invalidating an Idaho voter registration statute which required that
every registrant affirm by oath that he neither practiced bigamy or po-
lygamy nor belonged to an organization that advocated such practices.
In Bradfield v. Roberts,'6 the plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that an
agreement between the commissioners of the District of Columbia and
a hospital operated by members of the Sisters of Charity, a Roman
Catholic order, violated the Establishment Clause.
Almost fifty years after Bradfield, in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion,7 the Court applied the Establishment Clause to the states for the
first time.' 8 Everson arose from a resolution adopted by the Board of
Education in the township of Ewing, New Jersey, which directed that
parents whose children must ride public buses to school be reimbursed
for the amount of the fares. The school board claimed to have author-
ity to take this action under a New Jersey statute which specified that:
14. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the conviction of a
Mormon resident of the Territory of Utah under a federal statute that made polygamy a
crime in the territories was upheld in spite of a "free exercise" challenge. In his opinion
affirming the conviction, Chief Justice Waite distinguished between practice and belief in a
way that suggested that the latter enjoyed constitutional protection while the former did not.
This distinction was restated in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), in which Jus-
tice Roberts, writing for the Court, said, "Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts-
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the
second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society." Id
at 303-04. The trend of modem development has been to provide "action" a degree of
constitutional protection by requiring interference with free exercise to be justified by a com-
pelling state interest. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Leo Pfeffer provides
an analysis of the development of the Free Exercise Clause in Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free
Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115 (1973). For an example of pre-Reynolds treatment of state inter-
vention in church disputes, see Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
15. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
16. 175 U.S. 291 (1899). Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), also raised an Estab-
lishment Clause issue, but like Davis and Bradfield it is no longer doctrinally important.
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18. In doing so, the Court ignored the fact that the Blaine Amendment, H.R. Res. 1,
44th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 CONG. REC. 5190 (1876), which was designed to apply the religion
clauses to the states, failed to pass in 1876. 4 CONG. REC. at 5595. This was only eight years
after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the Everson Court used to justify
application of the clauses to the states. The Blaine Amendment specified that "[n]o State
shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, and no. money raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools, or
derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be
under the control of any religious sect or denomination; nor shall any money so raised or
lands so devoted. . . be divided between religious sects or denominations." 4 CONG. REC.
at 5190.
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[W]henever in any district there are children living remote from
any school house, the board of education of the district may
make rules and contracts for the transportation of such children
to and from school, including the transportation of school chil-
dren to and from school other than a public school, except such
school as is operated for profit in whole or in part.'9
A taxpayer in the district brought an action claiming that, among other
things,2" the resolution and statute violated the Establishment Clause
by forcing citizens to pay taxes to help support schools that were dedi-
cated to, and that taught, the Catholic faith. Writing for the Court,
Justice Black argued that the purpose of the Establishment Clause was
to erect "'a wall of separation between church and state.' "2, By char-
acterizing the New Jersey statute and resolution as "public welfare leg-
islation," however, he managed to avoid finding the statute and
resolution unconstitutional.22 Black's contention was that paying the
bus fares of children attending church schools was no more an estab-
lishment of religion than having state-paid policemen detailed to pro-
tect children going to and from church schools from traffic hazards. In
fact, Black suggested that cutting church schools off from the benefits
that accrue to them incidentally through public welfare legislation
might conflict with the First Amendment: "That Amendment requires
the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believ-
ers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adver-
sary."' 3 Although Everson did not provide a comprehensive test for
"establishment," it did offer the following three guidelines: (1) direct
contributions of money to parochial schools by the state would violate
the Establishment Clause; (2) no constitutional violation results if ben-
19. Act of June 9, 1941, 1941 N.J. Laws 589; see also N.J. REV. STAT. § 8 (1941).
20. The taxpayer also pressed a due process claim. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. at 5-8.
21. Id at 16. Justice Black cited Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), as
authority for this Jeffersonian interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
22. "New Jersey cannot consistently with the 'establishment of religion' clause of the
First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches
the tenets and faith of any church. On the other hand, other language of the amendment
commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own reli-
gion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith,
because of theirfaith, or lack ofit, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.
While we do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to
children attending public schools, we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New
Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit
New Jersey from extending its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to
their religious belief." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 16.
23. .d at 18.
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efits from public welfare legislation accrue to church schools; and
(3) the First Amendment requires that the state remain "neutral" in
matters of religion.
The sixteen years following Everson saw a vigorous development
of Establishment Clause doctrine,24 which culminated in the test an-
nounced in School District ofAbington Townshio v. Schempp .25 At issue
in Schempp was the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that re-
quired that "[a]t least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read,
without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school
day. Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading. . . upon the
written request of his parent or guardian. '2 6 In striking down the law,
the Court held that for legislation "to withstand the strictures of the
Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."'27
24. In the period between the Everson and Schempp cases, the Court decided five Estab-
lishment Clause suits: Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education. 333 U.S. 203 (1948),
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
25. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The companion case to Schempp, Murray v. Curlett, involved
a school board rule similar to the Pennsylvania statute challenged in Schempp.
26. 24 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (Purdon 1962), amended by Pub. L. No. 1928
(Supp. 1960).
27. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. In the wake of the
Court's involvement with the religion clauses came a reexamination of the premises, see
infra note 82 and accompanying text, on which the exemptions granted to religious organi-
zations had been based. See, e.g., Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemption for Reli-
gious Activities, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95, 95-116 (D. Oaks ed. 1963);
Korbel, Do the Federal Income Tax Laws Involve an "Establishment of Religion?", 53 A.B.A.
J. 1018 (1967); Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and Labor Legislation, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. SOC. PROBS. 144 (1949); Note, Constitutionality of Tax Benefts Accorded
Religion, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 968 (1949). Those commentators who believed that the grant-
ing of such exemptions and other tax benefits violated the Establishment Clause largely
based their views on the conviction that such benefits amounted to state support of religion.
See, e.g., Korbel, supra, at 1018; see also Hurvich,Religion and the Taing Power, 35 U. CIN.
L. REv. 531 (1966) (arguing that by granting tax exemptions to religious organizations, state
and federal governments are, in effect, subsidizing religion).
As appealing as this argument might seem, however, it is seriously flawed. Boris Bittker
points out that it is far from clear just how an exemption amounts to a subsidy. Bittker,
Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969). As he puts it, "The anti-
exemption case. . . suffers from a crisis of definition." Id at 1296.
The problem of definition shows up in the following way in "the exemption as subsidy"
claim. Bittker invites us to consider the following individuals: (1) the British Ambassador
to the United States; (2) Mao Tse-Tung; (3) a Mississippi sharecropper whose family income
is below the exemption level; (4) the inmate of a home for the aged, who is supported by a
charitable organization; (5) a rich Texas oilman whose taxable income after deductions for
percentage depletion and charitable contributions is $500; (6) a person whose income of
$10,000 consists entirely of tax-exempt interest on municipal bonds. Id at 1303. It is plain
that all of these individuals are exempted from the federal income tax. But, is it plausible to
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B. The Entanglement Test
The next major development concerning Establishment Clause
doctrine came in Walz v. Tax Commission.2 8 The plaintiff in Walz
owned real estate in New York City. He brought suit seeking to enjoin
the New York City Tax Commission from granting property tax ex-
emptions to religious organizations for properties used exclusively for
religious worship. Walz's claim was that the exemptions indirectly re-
quired him to contribute to religious organizations and that this vio-
lated the religion clauses of the First Amendment.29 Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Burger applied the two-step test announced in
Schempp and found no constitutional violation. Concerning the first
prong of the test he wrote:
The legislative purpose of a property tax exemption is
neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is
neither sponsorship nor hostility. New York, in common with
the other States, has determined that certain entities that exist in
a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that
foster its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhib-
ited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of
those properties for nonpayment of taxes.
30
Thus, the New York Legislature's grant of exemption was held to be
properly motivated.
The second part of the test-whether the effect of the exemption
violates the Constitution-Chief Justice Burger evaluated by consider-
ing whether exemption gives rise to an excessive "entanglement" of
church and state. In finding that it does not, the Chief Justice argued
that exempting church property from taxation is a lesser entanglement
than taxing it:
Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involve-
ment of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church
regard them as receiving a subsidy by virtue of their exemption? It seems that the "exemp-
tion as subsidy" argument, if we try to make sense of it, requires us to regard everything that
escapes taxation as a subsidy. Bittker concludes that, "In short, the assertion that an exemp-
tion is equivalent to a subsidy is untrue, meaningless, or circular, depending on context,
unless we can agree on a "correct' or 'ideal' or 'normal' taxing structure as a benchmark
from which to measure departures." Id at 1304.
28. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
29. This was the first time the Supreme Court had considered this question. In Gibbons
v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886), however, the Court was asked to decide
whether certain church property being used to produce income came within a property tax
exemption granted by Congress. In finding that it did not, the Court implicitly accepted that
Congress had the power to grant exemptions to religious organizations. See id at 408.
30. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 672. -
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property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations
and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes.
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to
afford an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some,
but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing them.3"
The Chief Justice also recognized that "a direct money subsidy would
be a relationship pregnant with involvement"; 32 however, he rejected
the "exemption as subsidy" characterization, stating that "the grant of
a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not
transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from de-
manding that the church support the state.
33
From a doctrinal point of view, the most interesting aspect of
Walz is the Chief Justice's use of "entanglement" terminology. Until
Lemon v. Kurtzman ,3 it was unclear whether "excessive entanglement"
would be used as a separate test or was merely an elaboration of the
"secular effect" criterion. Lemon and its companion cases35 involved a
challenge to two state statutes. The Rhode Island Salary Supplement
Act36 authorized a fifteen percent supplement to be paid to teachers in
non-public schools whose per pupil average expenditures on secular
education were below those of public schools. No instructor teaching
courses in religion could qualify for the subsidy under the plan. More-
over, to be eligible, a teacher could only teach courses available in the
public schools and had to use the same materials. Under Penn-
sylvania's Non-Public Elementary and Secondary Education Act,37 the
state was allowed to purchase specified secular educational services
from nonpublic schools. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
held that the relationships created by these statutes entailed an exces-
31. Id. at 674. Although the Chief Justice's language hints that taxation of churches
might be unconstitutional, the 10th Circuit has stated that "tax exemptions are a matter of
legislative grace." Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854
(10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). More recently, the issue of whether tax
exemptions of religious organizations can be revoked has been answered in the affirmative
in connection with religious organizations that discriminate on the basis of race. See, e.g.,
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub
nom. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 454 U.S. 892 (1981) (IRS revoked
tax-exempt status of university on the basis of university rules prohibiting interracial dating
and marriage and its previous policy of refusing to admit unmarried blacks).
32. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 675.
33. Id Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, cited Bittker's article, supra note 27,
and argued that an exemption is not a subsidy. 397 U.S. at 690.
34. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35. Early v. DiCenso, and Comm'n. of Educ. v. DiCenso.
36. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-51-1 to 16-51-9 (Supp. 1970) (repealed 1980).
37. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5608 (Purdon 1971) (repealed 1977).
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sive entanglement between government and religion. In so doing he
also set forth an important analytical framework:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion. . . ; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.""8
This framework now serves as the touchstone for Establishment Clause
doctrine.
Two bases for excessive entanglement have been explicitly recog-
nized by the Court. In Walz, it was suggested that unconstitutional
entanglement would arise from legislation requiring continuing and in-
trusive administrative oversight by the state. In Lemon, the Court
identified the divisive political potential of the state aid programs
brought before it as constituting "excessive entanglement."39
II. Qualitative Analysis of the Excessive Entanglement Test
Although Walz involved a property tax exemption, it can be read
broadly to stand for the proposition that the granting of tax exemptions
to religious organizations, whether by Congress or by state legislatures,
is not a per se violation of the Constitution. This article wil argue that
this position is wrong and that it results from an insufficient considera-
tion of the entanglement issue.
A. Problems with the Wakz Decision
In his dissent in Walz, Justice Douglas framed the issue as being
whether those who are organized into religious organizations get tax
benefits "merely because they are believers, while non-believers,
whether organized or not, must pay the real estate taxes."4 He opined
that "in common understanding one of the best ways to 'establish' one
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
39. Id at 622-23. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently found that the City of
Philadelphia's expenditure of more than $200,000 to construct a special platform and pro-
vide other extraordinary assistance for papal ceremonies at Logan Circle involved "exces-
sive entanglement" of church and state because, inter alia, of its potential for political
divisiveness. Gilfillan v. City of Philadelphia, 637 F.2d 924, 932 (1980). Interestingly, the
Court took the position that legal actions brought to enjoin the City's assistance were suffi-
cient evidence for finding entanglement on the basis of "potential divisiveness." Id Poten-
tial "political divisiveness" as a basis for finding "excessive entanglement" has been strongly
criticized. See, e.g., Ball, What is Religion?, 8 CHRISTIAN LAW. 1, 11-15 (1979).
40. 397 U.S. at 700.
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or more religions is to subsidize them, which a tax exemption does."4
In sum, Justice Douglas was displeased with the decision because it
upheld a law that demonstrates a significant preference for religions
and the religious over the nonreligious or the antireligious. This legally
expressed preference, he argued, constitutes an establishment of reli-
gion. But not all legally expressed preferences concerning religion are
objectionable to Douglas:
There is a line between what a state may do in encouraging "reli-
gious" activities . . . and what a state may not do by using its
resources to promote "religious" activities. . . or bestowing ben-
efits because of them. Yet that line may not always be clear.
Closing public schools on Sunday is in the former category; sub-
sidizing churches, in my view, is in the latter.4'
Professor Kurland, on the other hand, argues that Walz, along
with many other Establishment Clause cases, was decided by "[j]udicial
discretion, rather.than constitutional mandate."43 He states as follows:
[The entanglement criterion] is either empty or nonsensical ....
The word entanglement is only an antonym for separation. The
former assures no more guidance than the latter. . . . The pri-
mary purpose and the primary effect of the New York tax exemp-
tion for church property in Walz was to aid the churches or their
adherents. That was not only its primary purpose and effect, it
was its sole purpose and effect. But it was held to have passed the
test.44
While the remarks of Justice Douglas and Professor Kurland are co-
gent criticisms, a more fundamental problem may be found in Walz.
In applying the entanglement test, the majority failed to evaluate the
meaning of entanglement from a qualitative point of view.
Justice Brennan, discussing the entanglement issue, stated that
even though exemptions may be a passive form of involvement with
religion, their termination would not "quantitativey lessen the extent of
state involvement with religion. 45 Similarly, when Chief Justice Bur-
ger considered the relative degree of entanglement that would result
from nonexemption, he merely enumerated several additional tax-re-
lated transactions that would take place between churches and the state
if no exemptions were provided-such as tax valuation of property and
41. Id at 701.
42. Id.
43. Kurland, supra note 6, at 20.
44. Id. at 19-20 (footnote omitted).
45. Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. at 691 (emphasis added).
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tax foreclosures.46 With the exception of Justice Harlan,47 it appears
that in analyzing the entanglement question, the majority concerned
itself exclusively with the number or the extent of the administrative
contacts occasioned by exemption, rather than with the nature of the
government involvement.
The central question, therefore, is whether measurement of entan-
glement along such a dimension is appropriate. Let us assume for a
moment that there is no provision in the statute that exempts religious
organizations and that therefore church property is taxable. Let us also
assume that the Walz majority is correct in asserting that this would
increase the number of tax-related transactions between church and
state.41 What the majority fails to note is that none of these transac-
46. Id at 674. Chief Justice Burger's concern over possible tax valuations, tax liens,
and tax foreclosures is somewhat surprising in view of the role courts have played in the
vastly more sensitive area of disputes within churches over the control and disposition of
church property. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, rehj' denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, 83 N.J. 572, 417 A.2d
19 (1980), cert. deniedsub nom. Moore v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 449 U.S. 1131 (1981).
In addition to entering into property disputes, at least one state supreme court has also
found that no excessive entanglement occurs when a court enforces a statute requiring a
church to hold certain books and records open for inspection by church members. See, e.g.,
Bourgeois v. Landrum, 396 So. 2d 1275 (La. 1981).
47. It should be noted that Justice Harlan stated that the statute granting the exemption
was so broad in its grant of exemptions that its administration "need not entangle govern-
ment in difficult classifications of what is or not religious." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
at 698. See also N.Y. REAL PROP. TAx LAw § 420 (Supp. 1969). It is plain from the statute
that Justice Douglas is correct in saying there is no basis for claiming that the statute does
not involve government in such classifications. 397 U.S. at 700.
48. In fact, this assumption seems clearly wrong. Determination of which groups and
activities are eligible for various exemptions and deductions has apparently led to considera-
ble involvement by the government. In United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d 985 (5th Cir.
1980), the appellate court held that an IRS summons seeking all documents relating to the
organizational structure of the church since its inception, all church correspondence files for
a certain period, minutes of all church meetings of officers, directors, trustees, or ministers
during a certain period, and a sample of every piece of literature pertaining to the church
was overbroad. (The IRS summons was part of an investigation of the church's tax-exempt
status and its classification as an organization to which tax deductible contributions could be
made under I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i). The instructions for the production of documents re-
quired 14 numbered paragraphs in the summons. See United States v. Holmes, 614 F.2d at
987 n.3.) The court did, however, affirm the right of the IRS to demand documents in its
investigation. But any summons seeking the production of documents would have to be
narrower than the original.
In United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1979), the appellate court
upheld an IRS summons challenged on the ground that, inter alia, the summons was not
issued in good faith because it failed to meet the relevancy requirement of United States v.
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). The court in Freedom Church stated that the relevancy
requirement of a summons issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602 is "whether the inspection
156 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 10:145
tions takes place between the state and churches as such. That is to say,
the fact that the owner of taxable property is a church or other religious
organization has no significance vis-A-vis the statute imposing the tax.
In contrast, when exemptions are granted specifically to religious orga-
nizations the "religious" nature of the organization becomes the opera-
tive fact triggering application of the law. By granting an exemption in
this manner, the government necessarily assumes the power to deter-
mine what constitutes a "religion." Whether the government overtly
formulates a definition or does so implicitly through the enforcement of
the tax laws is relatively unimportant. In either case, the government
can express official approval or disapproval of certain religious prac-
tices and beliefs through its power either to grant or to withhold ex-
empt status. The critical factor is the power of definition that
necessarily attends the use of a religion-based category. The assump-
tion of this power constitutes the most fundamental and obnoxious
form of entanglement.
B. The Court's Analysis of Religion-Based Categories
in Non-Tax Statutes
The failure of the Court to take into account the qualitative aspect
of the entanglement issue in Walz is perplexing.49 At least as early as
Cantwell v. Connecticut,5° the Court displayed an awareness of the fact
that investing government officers with the authority to decide what is
or is not a religion offends the First Amendment. Cantwell involved a
sought 'might have thrown light upon' the correctness of the taxpayer's returns." 613 F.2d at
321 (citing United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923
(1979)). The court continued by asserting that the power given to the IRS under § 7602 is so
broad that the IRS is "licensed to fish." 613 F.2d at 321 (citing United States v. Giordano,
419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970)). Clearly, the Noall test
scarcely restrains the IRS from rummaging freely.
In view of the IRS's power to determine the tax-exempt status of an organization on the
basis of whether or not it is a church or is adequately church-related, and its power to
rummage virtually at will through the records and documents of organizations it investi-
gates, Chief Justice Burger's concern over the degree of entanglement arising from such
arm's length matters as tax valuations, liens, and foreclosures seems rather odd.
As a final matter, it should be noted that the appellant in Freedom Church attempted to
rely on 26 U.S.C. § 7605(c): "Restriction on Examination of Churches." Both the language
of § 7605(c) and the Court's reading of § 7602 show that § 7605(c) provides negligible pro-
tection.
For an excellent discussion of "church distinctions" in the IRC, see Whelan, "Church"
in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 885 (1977).
Whelan's article specifies in some detail the extent to which special tax treatment of religious
organizations involves governmental entanglement with religion.
49. Unfortunately, Walz's attorney did not raise this issue in his brief.
50. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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statute5 requiring anyone who wanted to solicit money or valuables
for a religious cause to obtain a certificate from a designated state offi-
cial. In striking down the statute under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court stated:
It will be noted.., that the Act requires an application to
the secretary of the public welfare council of the State; that he is
empowered to determine whether the cause is a religious one;
and that the issue of a certificate depends upon his affirmative
action. . . . He is authorized to withhold his approval if he de-
termines that the cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship
of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a
denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment and included
in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth. 2
A similar sensitivity was expressed in United States v. Ballard3
about the types of problems involved in official judgments concerning
what qualifies as a religion. In Ballard, the defendants allegedly used
the mails in a fraudulent scheme involving the defendants' religious
beliefs. The central issue was whether the district court erred in not
submitting to the jury the issue of the truth of the defendants' beliefs.
Justice Douglas wrote for the majority:
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men may be-
lieve what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof
of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences
which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to
others . ... The religious views espoused by respondents might
seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding
their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with the religious
beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact undertake that task,
they enter a forbidden domain. 4
Thus, the Court upheld the judgment of the lower court on free exer-
cise grounds.55
51. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6294 (1930), amended by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 860(d) (Supp.
1937).
52. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. at 305. Restrictions on solicitation still receive
careful scrutiny from the federal courts under the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Espinosa
v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980). The secular purpose test of Establishment Clause
doctrine was recently used to affirm the decision of a district court, invalidating a Minnesota
statute which created classifications that would have favored efforts by some religious
groups to solicit funds over the efforts of other religious groups. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d
562 (8th Cir. 1981).
53. 322 U.S. 78 (1943).
54. Id at 86-87.
55. Id at 88. Even though the Court held that the issue of truth or falsity of religious
beliefs could not be submitted to a jury, it found that the sincerity of those beliefs was a
proper jury question. Two relatively recent cases in which the sincerity issue was adjudi-
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As in Cantwell, the Court in Ballard objected to substantive gov-
ernmental judgments about religion. But if the government is not al-
lowed to decide what is a "true" religious view, then neither should it
have the power to do what is virtually the same thing---to decide
whether an organization is truly a religion.
5 6
Certain members of the Court have nonetheless recognized that
certain actions that merely indicate, or that may be construed to indi-
cate, official approval or sanction also offend the Establishment Clause.
As Justice Black wrote in a footnote to his dissent in Zorach v. Clauson:
"A state policy of aiding 'all religions' necessarily requires a govern-
mental decision as to what constitutes 'a religion.' Thus is created a
governmental power to hinder certain religious beliefs by denying their
character as such. . . ."I' Later, speaking for a unanimous Court in
Torcaso v. Watkins,58 Black stated: "Neither [the state nor the federal
government] can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements
which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid
those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against
those religions founded on different beliefs."59
Questions about the constitutional propriety of legislative and bu-
reaucratic use of religion-based categories also arose in the context of
the Vietnam War. In United States v. Seeger,61 section 60) of the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act6' was attacked under the reli-
gion clauses. The statute exempted from combatant training and
service in the armed forces those persons who were conscientiously op-
cated are Teterud v. Bums, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975), and Theriault v. Silber, 391 F.
Supp. 578 (W.D. Tex. 1975).
56. In Ballard, the Court acknowledged the propriety of a "sincerity" test. 322 U.S. at
78. In the case of statutes granting exemptions, no statute simply limits the discretion of the
deciding official to judgments about "sincerity." For a trenchant, and I believe correct, criti-
cism of the "sincerity" standard, see Justice Jackson's dissent in Ballard. 322 U.S. at 92-93.
57. 343 U.S. 306, 318 n.4 (1952).
58. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Torcaso involved an appointee to the office of Notary Public in
Maryland, whose commission was denied because he would not declare his belief in God, as
required by the Maryland Constitution.-
59. Id at 495. The following year in Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), Justice Black,
again writing for the Court, expressed the view that "[t]he Establishment Clause thus stands
as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is
too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its unhallowed perversion by a civil magistrate."
Id at 431-32 (footnote omitted).
60. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
61. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958) (amended in 1967 to strike provision that required
religious training and belief stem from the individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relationship, and to eliminate
requirement for a hearing by Department of Justice when there is an appeal from local
board decision denying conscientious objector status).
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posed to participation in war in any form because of their religous
training and belief. The relevant section defined "religious training
and belief' as "an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but
[not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views
or a merely personal moral code."'6 2 Seeger based his claim for consci-
entious objector status on opposition to war in any form and on reli-
gious belief. He specified in his application for conscientious objector
status, however, that he regarded the existence of a Supreme Being as
an open question and that he was skeptical about the existence of God.
He further specified that he did not have "a lack of faith in anything
whatsoever,"63 but that he had a "belief in and devotion to goodness
and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical
creed."'
Seeger's attack on the statute cited its failure to exempt non-
religious conscientious objectors and claimed that it discriminated
against different forms of religious expression. The Court avoided the
constitutional issues by, in effect, dropping from the statutory definition
of "religious training and belief' the requirement of a "belief in a rela-
tion to a Supreme Being." The test of "belief in a relation to a
Supreme Being," said the Court, "is whether a given belief that is sin-
cere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel
to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies
for the exemption."6 The result of the Court's construction was that
one could be denied conscientious objector status only if one's objec-
tion to service was based on a moral code "which is not only personal
but which is the sole basis for the registrant's belief and is in no way
related to a Supreme Being."66 Consequently, Seeger was within the
statutory language, said the Court, since "[h]e did not disavow any be-
lief 'in a relation to a Supreme Being'; indeed he stated that 'the cosmic
order does,perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.' ",67
The next challenge to section 60) came in Welsh v. United States,"
which was handed down shortly after Walz. Again, the Court demon-
strated uneasiness about religion-based classifications. Welsh argued
62. Id
63. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
64. Id
65. Id This standard was originally formulated by the California Supreme Court. See
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957).
66. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 186.
67. Id at 187 (emphasis added).
68. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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that section 6(j) clearly violated the Establishment Clause. He denied,
however, that his objection to service was "religious" and stated that
his beliefs were formed by his study in the subjects of history and soci-
ology. Later, he claimed that his views were "religious" in the "ethical
sense" of the word.
Though the Court recognized that Welsh's position was partially
based on his view of world politics, it nevertheless held that Welsh
qualified for conscientious objector status under the statutory language.
The Court noted:
We certainly do not think that section 6(j)'s exclusion of those
persons with "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views or a merely personal moral code" should be read to ex-
clude those who hold strong beliefs about our domestic and for-
eign affairs or even those whose conscientious objection to
participation in all wars is founded to a substantial extent upon
considerations of public policy.
69
The only persons who the Court was willing to say would not fall
within the exemption were those "whose beliefs are not deeply held
and those whose objections to war do not rest at all on moral, ethical,
or religious principle but instead rest solely upon considerations of pol-
icy, pragmatism, or expediency."70 The result of this "construction," as
Justice Harlan pointed out in his concurring opinion, was to eliminate
the "statutorily required religious content for a conscientious objector
exemption."'" As judicially rewritten, the statute appears to exempt
from military service virtually anyone who opposes all war in good
faith.72
Although the Court refused to face squarely the constitutional is-
sues in Seeger and Welsh, it demonstrated that when faced with a
clear-cut challenge to a religion-based classification, it would go to ex-
traordinary lengths to deny giving effect to the plain terms of the
classification.
The unreflective application of the entanglement test in Walz,
then, is surprising, since both before and after Walz the Court has
shown itself aware that governmental judgments about religion, even
those judgments that simply purport to determine whether an organiza-
tion is a religion, are fraught with constitutional difficulties. Unfortu-
69. Id at 342.
70. Id. at 342-43.
71. Id at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring).
72. Should Congress reinstitute conscription with an exemption for conscientious objec-
tors, Seeger and Welsh could very likely result in a "loophole" larger than that provided by
the student deferment during the Vietnam era draft.
Fall 1982] RELIGION-BASED CATEGORIES: ENTANGLEMENT 161
nately, post-Walz Establishment Clause cases have advanced the
analysis and application of the entanglement criterion little, if at all.73
III. Religion-Based Categories in the Internal Revenue Code
As should be apparent, the problem of entanglement is a problem
inherent in religion-based classifications per se, and is not limited to the
specific exemptions that have been granted to religious organizations in
all fifty states. Such classifications arise in state and local laws74 and
regulations as well as at the federal level, but in no part of the law are
religion-based classifications more pervasive than in the Internal Reve-
nue Code. As Commissioner Kurtz stated not long ago, "our tax law
places the IRS near the forefront in making delicate decisions involving
definitions of 'religious' and 'church'.
7 5
A. History of Tax Benefits for Religious Organizations
Religions appear to have enjoyed tax exemptions in one form or
another for at least as long as there has been a historical record con-
cerning taxation.76 In the colonial and early post-Revolutionary peri-
ods, church property often was immune from taxation since churches
frequently had the status of "established" public institutions.77 By the
73. These cases have typically involved facially neutral statutes that have been chal-
lenged as providing subsidies to church-related schools. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (public funds to reimburse nonpublic
schools for various services mandated by the state); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
(various forms of aid to nonpublic schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), reh'g
denied, 422 U.S. 1049 (1975) (state provision of "auxillary services" and text book loans to
children in nonpublic schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) (maintenance and repair grants to "qualifying" nonpublic schools and
tuition reimbursement and deduction plans); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (act cre-
ating Educational Facilities Authority to assist institutions of higher education through issu-
ance of revenue bonds); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
472 (1973) (reimbursement of nonpublic schools for various examination and reporting ex-
penses); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971) (federal con-
struction grants for college and university facilities); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, reh g
denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971) (acts authorizing salary supplements to teachers in nonpublic
schools and purchases of certain secular educational services from nonpublic schools).
74. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 634.5 (West Supp. 1982).
75. Speech at Practicing Law Institute Conference (Jan. 9, 1978), reprinted in Daily Tax
Report, Jan. 11, 1978, at J9, col. 2.
76. See, e.g., Genesis 47:26 and Ezra 7:24. The tradition of tax exemption for Christian
churches began in the 4th century A.D. when Constantine exempted church buildings and
land surrounding them that was used for church purposes. See 3 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 419 (1950). See also Zollmann, Tax Exemptions of Churches,
14 MICH. L. REv. 646, 648 (1916).
77. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 461-62
(1959). See also C. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCH LAW 328 (1933).
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time the First Amendment was ratified, however, only Connecticut,
Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire still afforded a substan-
tial degree of "establishment" to churches.78 Not until 1833, however,
when Massachusetts amended its constitution to limit religion to volun-
tary support, was disestablishment complete.
79
Disestablishment, however, did not bring revocations of property
tax exemptions in its wake. ° In fact, the states, including those that
had disestablished their churches, took legislative and constitutional
action to exempt church property from property taxes.8' These exemp-
tions were typically defended on grounds of public policy:
It is presumed that in the nineteenth century, in a christian
land, no argument is necessary to show that church purposes are
public purposes, and that the inhabitants of a town have an inter-
est in the ground reserved for such a use. We all know what is
meant by the phrase, nor will we indulge in the thought, that the
trust will not be carried out in the spirit in which it was originally
created. To deny that church purposes are public purposes, is to
argue that the maintenance, support and propagation of the
christian religion is not a matter of public concern. Our laws,
although they recognize no particular religious establishment, are
not insensible to the advantages of christianity .... 82
The tradition of exemption of church property has survived, and, al-
though the practice has not been without its critics, 3 churches currently
enjoy such exemptions in all fifty states.84
Until the early part of this century, the primary tax benefit enjoyed
by religious organizations was the property tax exemption. With the
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment 5 and the revolution in public
78. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 141 (1953).
79. Prior to 1833, the Congregational Church was the established religion in Massachu-
setts. See Ball, supra note 39, at 7.
80. See, e.g., Note, Tax Exemptions, Subsidies and Religious Freedom After Walz v. Tax
Commission, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876, 880 (1970).
81. Id at 881. For a discussion of the evolution of the relationship between church and
state on the matter of establishment and church property taxation in New Hampshire, see
Franklin Street Soc'y v. Manchester, 60 N.H. 342, 346-51 (1880) (opinion of Allen, J.).
82. City of Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634, 639 (1852). See also argument by Cross,
counsel for plaintiff, in Franklin Street Soe'y v. Manchester, 60 N.H. 342 (1880).
83. President Grant was one of the outspoken critics of the exemptions for church prop-
erty. See Grant's Message to Congress, reprinted in 4 CONG. REc. 175 (1875).
84. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 685 (1970). In fact, most states have
incorporated provisions into their constitutions that either permit or require the exemption
of church property from property taxation. See Note, The Establishment Dilemma" Exemp-
tion of Religiously Used Propert, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 533, 535 n.14 (1970).
85. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
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finance that followed, came important new tax benefits for religious
organizations.8 6 Included in the Income Tax Act of 1913 was a provi-
sion exempting "any corporation or association organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational pur-
poses."'8 7  A second major benefit was provided by Congress in the
Revenue Act of 1917, which declared to be deductible "[c]ontributions
or gifts actually made within the year to corporations or associations
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
or educational purposes."' 8 Subsequent revisions of the Income Tax
Act retained the substance of these provisions. Today, sections
501(c)(3) and 170(a) and (c) are the operative lineal descendants of the
original exemption and deduction provisions. While other provisions
in the Internal Revenue Code grant benefits to, or place requirements
upon, religious organizations, 9 sections 501 and 170 are the most
86. The favorable treatment that the new scheme of income taxation gave churches was
not unprecedented. The first federal income tax act, Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292,
passed to finance the Civil War, was amended in 1864 to exempt "managers ... of any
charitable, benevolent, or religious association" that could demonstrate that the profits
would be put to charitable use, Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § f11, 13 Stat. 223, 279. The
ill-fated income tax act of 1894 went further by exempting "corporations ... or associa-
tions organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes." Act
of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556-57. What was, in effect, the first corporate
income tax statute--the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909--contained a similar provision.
Act of Aug. 5, 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-17.
87. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § II G(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172.
88. Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330.
89. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 107, 511, 6033 (1982). The best-known exemption granted reli-
gious organizations under the Internal Revenue Code is that provided by § 501(c)(3). This
provision exempts the income of religious and certain other organizations from the income
tax. To qualify for the exemption, an organization must be organized and operated exclu-
sively for one or more exempt purposes (e.g., educational, charitable, or religious). "An
organization will be regarded as 'operated exclusively' for one or more exempt purposes
only if it engages primarily in activities" designed to further the purposes specified in
§ 501(c)(3). "An organization will not be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of
its activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose," Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)
(1959). The regulations specifically deny exempt status to "action" organizations, which are
described in part as organizations that devote a substantial part of their activities attempting
to influence legislation by propaganda or otherwise, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)
(1959). In addition to meeting these criteria, any organization seeking exemption under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) must file an application with the Commissioner containing a detailed
statement of its proposed activities, which he must then approve. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(b)(1)(v) (1959). Following submission of the statement, a successful applicant will receive
a "determination" letter informing it of its tax-exempt status. Until that time, the organiza-
tion must file a return. INTERNAL REVENUE SERvICE, PUn. No. 557, How TO APPLY FOR
RECOGN ITON OF EXEMPTION FOR AN ORGANIZATION 1 (1976). The exemption is effective
from the date of the formation of the organization as long as all its purposes and activities
prior to the ruling were those required by law. Id. at 2.
I.R.C. § 107 provides another well-known exemption for religious organizations. In
this provision the Code states: "In the case of a minister of the gospel, gross income does not
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important.
Constitutional challenges have been brought in state and federal
courts against the various exemptions enjoyed by religious organiza-
tions, but no violation of the First Amendment has been found."
B. Religion-Based Categories in the Internal Revenue Code
The number of religion-based classifications in the Internal Reve-
nue Code has increased significantly in the last thirty years. 9' Professor
Charles Whelan has identified fifteen religion-based categories used in
the Code.92 The religious distinctions therein, writes Professor Whelan,
are roughly divided into three groups: "those concerned with whether
an activity or purpose is 'religious' or 'exclusively religious'; those con-
cerned with clergymen and members of religious orders; and those con-
include (1) the rental value of a home furnished to him as part of his compensation; or
(2) the rental allowance paid to him as part of his compensation to the extent used by him to
rent or provide a home." In Treas. Reg. § 1.107-1(a) (1982), the IRS specifies that to qualify
for the exclusion "the home or rental allowance must be provided as remuneration for serv-
ices which are ordinarily the duties of a minister of the gospel . . . . [F]or purposes of
section 107 [these] include the performance of sacerdotal functions, the conduct of religious
worship, the administration and maintenance of religious organizations and their integral
agencies, and the performance of teaching and administrative duties at theological seminar-
ies."
In addition to the foregoing, there are a number of other tax benefits given under fed-
eral tax laws to religious organizations. See, e.g., Hurvich, Religion and the Taxing Power,
U. CIN. L. REv. 531, 532 (1966).
90. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Lundberg v. County of Ala-
meda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1 (1956), appeal dismissed sub nonL Heisey v. County of
Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956).
91. See Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45
FORDHAM L. REv. 885 (1977).
92. The categories Whelan describes are: (1) "religious purposes"; (2) "a religious or-
ganization described in § 501(c)(3)"; (3) "church"; (4) "a church or a convention or associa-
tion of churches"; (5) "church agency"; (6) "church plan"; (7) "integrated auxilliaries" of
churches; (8) § 501(c)(3) organizations that are "operated, supervised or controlled by or in
connection with a religious organization described in section 501(c)(3)"; (9) an organization
"operated primarily for religious purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or
principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches"; (10) "duly
ordained, commissioned, or licensed minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry";
(11) "religious and apostolic association"; (12) "religious order"; (13) "exclusively religious
activities of any religious order"; (14) "member of a religious order in the exercise of duties
required by such order"; and (15) "religious sect" Whelan, supra note 91, at 887-89. He also
points to other religious terms. that appear in the Internal Revenue Code: "Section 107
speaks of a 'minister of the gospel.' Section 512(b)(12) uses the terms 'diocese,' 'province of
a religious order,' and 'parish, individual church, district, or other local unit' of a diocese,
province of a religious order, or a convention or association of churches. 'Christian Science
practitioner' appears in §§ 1402(c)(5) and 1402(e). Section 7701(a)(19)(C)(v) includes 'real
property used primarily for church purposes' in the definition of a 'domestic building and
loan association."' Whelan, supra note 91, at 889.
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cerned with the various categories of church ard church-related
organizations, including religious orders." 93 The third group, which in-
cludes what Whelan calls "church distinctions," is largely responsible
for the significant growth of religion-based categories since 1950. 91
1. Church Distinctions
Professor Whelan's "church distinctions" date from the 1950 en-
actment of a tax on "unrelated" business income that previously had
been exempt from federal income taxation under section 501(a). 95 The
tax was enacted out of concern over the operation of various commer-
cial enterprises by exempt organizations that competed with taxpaying
businesses. Since then, many of the other distinctions previously listed
have been added. The most recent additions have come in ERISA leg-
islation and legislation regulating lobbying by section 501(c)(3) organi-
zations.9 6 The impetus for creating these distinctions derives from
many sources, but frequently the intent has been to increase the taxa-
tion and monitoring of what some consider the more peripheral opera-
tions of section 501(c)(3) organizations. 97
Unfortunately the criteria that have guided the creation of "church
distinctions" have been "'churchness' or 'church-relatedness.' "8 In
effect, the Congress and the IRS have taken it upon themselves to tell
churches which of their parts are or are not integral to their church
structures. Needless to say, this has created significant conflict between
churches and the federal government. 99
2. The Significance of Church Structure
Part of the problem of determining whether an activity is "church-
related" arises from the double structure of churches. The first struc-
ture is determined by ecclesiastical law, and the second is determined
93. Whelan, supra note 91, at 901 (footnotes omitted).
94. Whelan argues that "church distinctions" are "responsible for the confusion about
the meaning of the word 'church' in the Code." Id This group includes distinctions con-
cerning churches, their integrated auxiliaries, religious orders, other kinds of church-related
organizations, and conventions and association& of churches. See id
95. Id at 902.
96. Id at 901.
97. See, e.g., remarks of Representative Lynch (N.Y.) during the floor debate on legisla-
tion that imposed income taxation on "unrelated business income" of most 501(c)(3) organi-
zations, reprinted in 96 CONG. REc. 9364-69 (1950).
98. See Whelan, supra note 91, at 923.
99. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g) (especially 2(g)(5)(ii)) (1982). For a reaction to
IRS efforts to define or classify religious organizations according to their "church-related-
ness" or "exclusively religious" character, see Ball, supra note 39, at 7, 9-14, and Whelan,
supra note 91, at 891-901.
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by American civil law. Ecclesiastical structures are basically of two
kinds: hierarchical and congregational. 100 Hierarchical structures such
as those of the Roman Catholic or Mormon churches create, through
church law, a single church authority.' 0' In contrast, churches with a
congregational structure, such as the Baptists, do not, strictly speaking,
constitute a unified church at all. Rather, each congregation, instead of
comprising a division of a unified church, is autonomous. 0 2 Conse-
quently, there is no Baptist "Church" in the sense that there is a Mor-
mon or a Roman Catholic Church; there are only Baptist churches and
conventions or associations of Baptist churches.'
0 3
Distinctions that are easily made in the Internal Revenue Code
regarding corporate structure-such as what is or is not a subsidiary-
are not as easily drawn, then, when it comes to defining what is or is
not church-related. The difference may well depend less on tax consid-
erations than on the history of the particular denomination. As such,
the danger increases that such distinctions will be arbitrarily drawn, or
become politically controversial. This leads, in turn, to increased
church-state entanglement. ' 4
The tax on unrelated income imposed by Congress in 1950 intro-
duced the first "church distinction." This distinction was between "a
100. See Whelan, supra note 91, at 903.
101. See 8 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 525-27 (William J. MacDonald ed. 1967); 12
id. at 514-18.
102. See 2 id. at 75-80.
103. See Whelan, supra note 91, at 903.
From the perspective of American civil law, the picture is rather different. The ecclesi-
astical structure of a church often cannot be translated into civil law. Professor Whelan
wrote, "In the Roman Catholic Church, for example, the major internal structures are the
Holy See, the papacy, the patriarchates, provinces, archdioceses, dioceses and parishes, and
the religious orders. Some of these divisions are territorial; others. . . are 'personal' in the
sense that ecclesiastical jurisdiction does not depend upon geographical boundaries. In or-
der to establish an identity in American civil law, most of these ecclesiastical entities have
created one or more civil law corporations or trusts. But there is no American civil law
counterpart to the ecclesiastical unity of the Roman Catholic Church. . . . The fact that
these diverse civil law entities generally work together harmoniously is the result of the
internal hierarchical structure of the Roman Catholic Church, not the product of American
corporate or trust law.
"Thus, from a purely technical point of view, the Roman Catholic Church does not
exist as such for federal tax purposes. What does exist is a conglomeration . . . of distinct
taxable entities united in religious faith, worship and authority but not in civil law identity
or control." Id at 904-05 (footnotes omitted).
104. For a detailed discussion of the inapplicability of tax conventions to church struc-
tures, see id at 903-05. On the consequences of incorporating church schools separately
from their sponsoring churches, see Little, How Far is Too Far When the LRS. Examines
Your Church, 4 CHRISTIAN L.A. DEFENDER 22 (1981). This article provides some detail on
the "fishing expedition" character of IRS investigations.
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church, a convention or association of churches," which were exempt
from the tax, and religious, charitable, and educational organizations
"under church auspices," which were to be subject to the tax.10 5 In the
course of inplementing the distinction, there was considerable skir-
mishing between churches and the government over the "church-
ness" 10 6 of various religious organizations. 10 7 Since 1950, other church
distinctions have bred conflict in varying degrees.'05
105. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 944, § 422, 64 Stat. 948 (amending I.R.C. § 101(6) (1939)).
See also Whelan, supra note 91, at 902 for a discussion of this legislation. Politics, too, has
played a role in determinations of "church-relatedness." For example, as a result of a regu-
lation promulgated under I.R.C. § 511 in 1958, the Christian Brothers were forced to pay the
unrelated business tax on their wine and brandy business. But the income of WWL-TV, a
commercial station operated by Loyola University (New Orleans), a Jesuit institution, was
left exempt from the tax. The ostensible reason for this result was the regulation's "sacerdo-
tal functions" test. Religious orders with priests perform sacerdotal functions. Since the
Jesuit order contains priests as well as brothers, it passed the test. The Christian Brothers,
lacking priests, failed. This strange test and result is more readily understood when it is
pointed out that Russell Long and Hale Boggs, Jr., were well-disposed toward Loyola Uni-
versity, and the IRS did not care to antagonize both "an influential member of the House
Ways and Means Committee," and "an influential member of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee." See Whelan, supra note 91, at 910-11.
Lest it be thought that such goings-on are a thing of the past, the IRS recently reversed
itself in a private ruling and now takes the position that the television income and the foot-
ball income of institutions such as Notre Dame are not unrelated income! See PRiv. RUL.
Nos. 7930043 (Nov. 2, 1979), 7948113 (Aug. 31, 1979). For an account of how this came to
pass, see Whelan, Critical Developments in the Vow of Foverty Area and Update on Unrelated
Business, 25 CATH. LAW. 340, 341-42 (1980).
106. This is Professor Whelan's term. See Whelan, supra note 91, at 900.
107. These sorts of distinctions have assumed considerable importance on the state and
local levels. Many fundamentalist churches at present are vigorously resisting efforts of state
and local governments to treat church day-care centers, homes for delinquent boys and girls,
and schools as businesses or as merely church-supported organizations since such treatment
would subject them to licensure and other forms of regulation. The churches contend that
these activities are integral parts of their ministries and that therefore the regulatory efforts
by local and state governments violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Note, Georgia Girls'
Home Mins Dispute With Wefare, 4 CHRISTIAN L.A. DEFENDER 1 (1981); Missouri Seeks to
License Pre-School Ministries, 4 CHRISTIAN L.A. DEFENDER 12 (1981); Eldridge, Church
Preschook Business or Ministry?, 4 CHRISTiAN L.A. DEFENDER 18 (1981); Hands Off/, 4
CHRISTIAN L.A. DEFENDER 31 (1981). An excellent discussion of the problems arising out
of attempted state regulation of Christian colleges is provided in Kirk, Shelton College and
State Licensing of Religious Schools: An Educator's View of the Interface Between the Estab-
lishment andFree Exercise Clauses, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (1981). Under current
First Amendment doctrine, these controversies raise difficult questions concerning the scope
and meaning of "religion."
108. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(ii), T.D. 7454, 1977-1 C.B. 367-68; Ballsupra
note 39, at 7, 9-14; Whelan, supra note 91, at 891-901.
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3. Administration of Law on Unrelated Income
Through section 6033, the Internal Revenue Code imposes a re-
quirement that exempt organizations file financial returns each year
with the Internal Revenue Service. The Tax Reform Act of 196909
contained a provision amending section 6033 to eliminate the broad
exemption from the yearly filing requirement previously enjoyed by all
section 501(c)(3) religious organizations and many other section
501(c)(3) organizations." 0 In place of the broad exemption, the IRS
devised a scheme using a plethora of church distinctions. Filing re-
quirements were made to depend on whether an organization could be
characterized as: (1) a church, (2) a church-integrated auxiliary, (3) a
convention or association of churches, (4) the "exclusively religious ac-
tivit[y] of any religious order," (5) a section 501(c)(3) religious organi-
zation; or (6) a section 501(c)(3) organization "operated, supervised, or
controlled by or in connection with" a 501(c)(3) religious
organization. " ' I
In the course of attempting to provide some interpretive guidance
in applying these distinctions, the Treasury proposed regulations in
February, 1976, that, for example, would have imposed filing require-
ments on church-related hospitals and orphanages serving the entire
community, parochial elementary schools, and church-related old age
homes that provide service only to aged members of their respective
denominations." 2 The religious community protested vehemently that
the proposed regulations were an "attempt by [the] Treasury and the
Internal Revenue Service to 'define' the churches almost out of exist-
ence, especially with regard to their charitable, educational, and social
welfare activities."' '3 The proposed regulations eventually were with-
drawn. Those that were adopted in their place in January, 1977, dif-
fered substantially from the regulations proposed earlier, but they still
denied an exemption to separately incorporated church-related hospi-
tals, universities, old age homes, and orphanages by denying them sta-
tus as "integrated auxillaries." 1 4
109. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
110. Prior to adoption of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487,
§ 6033 exempted from annual filing requirements all § 501(c)(3) religious organizations and
other § 501(c)(3) organizations with a substantial connection with a § 501(c)(3) religious
organization.
I 11. I.R.C. §§ 6033(a)(2)(A)(i), (A)(iii), (C)(i), (C)(iv) (1982).
112. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5), 41 Fed. Reg. 6073 (1976) (proposed Feb. 11, 1976).
113. Whelan, supra note 91, at 895.
114. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5)(iv) (1982) (examples 1-3, 6). Even though the
final regulations gave a more favorable treatment to parochial schools, Professor Whelan
reported that churches will oppose them "as vigorously as they resisted the proposed regula-
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4. Vow of Poverty Ruling
The exemption of members of religious orders from income tax
further illustrates the effect of the increase in the number of religion-
based categories in the Code. From the adoption of Office Decision
119 in 1919, until the promulgation of Revenue Ruling 77-323 in 1976,
members of religious orders who had taken a vow of poverty were ex-
empted from payment of income tax on income received by them as
agents of their respective orders. Although the religious were techni-
cally subject to the income tax under Office Decision 119, that decision
specified that income received by an agent on behalf of a principal was
taxable only to the principal." 5 This policy allowed religious orders to
escape income tax as long as any revenue they received in excess of
actual living expenses was given to their order. Revenue Ruling 77-323
sought to change this situation radically. In effect, the Ruling provided
that all members of religious orders would have to pay income tax and
FICA on revenues they received unless they were working for their
own orders. 16 Not surprisingly, Ruling 77-323 caused a great deal of
concern among religious organizations that had orders. In a meeting
between lawyers representing the Roman Catholic Church and repre-
sentatives of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service following
the issuance of Ruling 77-323, the government was reported to have
refused to exempt religious who [were] working for a public en-
tity or for another 501(c)(3) organization. For example, the ques-
tion came up, "How about a religious who is teaching theology at
Harvard?" They said, "No way, he would be subject to taxa-
tion." They even took the position that if he were a Dominican
and he was working as a theology professor, in a Jesuit school, he
would be subject to taxes. They said that a member of a religious
order who was serving as the chaplain would be subject to in-
come tax."
17
tions. The fundamental vice remains: the regulations exclude the traditional educational,
charitable and welfare activities of the churches from the tax concept of 'church activities.'"
Whelan, supra note 91, at 898. In the same vein, Professor Whelan stated: "It should be
easier than it has been for Congress and federal tax officials to understand the utter astonish-
ment of the American churches at being told that their educational, charitable and welfare
organizations are not integral parts of their church structures. Most American churches
would prefer to retain the traditional exemption of these institutions from having to file
annual financial reports with the Internal Revenue Service. But they would not fight the
imposition of a reporting requirement nearly as hard if the requirement were imposed by
legislative language that did not distinguish between the traditional component parts of
American churches in terms of their 'churchness' or 'church-relatedness.'" Id. at 923.
115. O.D. 119, 1919-1 C.B. 82.
116. Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 C.B. 26.
117. Reed, Revenue Ruling 77-290--Vow of Poverty, 24 CATH. LAW. 217, 218 (1979).
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After some months of discussions, a new Revenue Ruling, 77-290,
was issued. It provided that if a religious were directed to provide serv-
ices for another agency of the supervising church or an associated insti-
tution, the religious would be deemed an agent of his order and thus
exempt from income and FICA taxes.' 8
After Ruling 77-290, some question remained as to whether the
agency relationship was the sole determining factor or whether the na-
ture of the work being done was also to be considered in making the
determination concerning exemption. Ruling 77-290 purportedly left
an earlier Revenue Ruling, 68-123, undisturbed. Ruling 68-123 pro-
vided that a religious nurse working in a non-Catholic private hospital
would be exempted. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that serv-
ice outside the church that produces income for the order falls outside
the exemption since this would not be part of the "mission" of the reli-
gious order. n 9
The small tempest over the rather exotic issue of exemption from
the income tax of those who have taken a vow of poverty again reveals
the extent to which the IRS must intrude upon the domain of religions,
even in relatively minor matters. In order to make a determination
under the rulings mentioned, the IRS might first have to determine
what is or is not an "order," a "church," an "associated institution,"
and the "mission" of an order. The level of entanglement here is
scarcely insignificant. When we make a qualitative comparison be-
tween this type of government entanglement and that feared by Justice
Burger,12 0 it is easy to see how this kind of government involvement in
the examination and categorization of church structure poses the
greater threat to the separation of church and state.
C. The Religious Audit
The enforcement procedures required by the use of religion-based
categories in the Code are another facet of the entanglement problem.
An ordinary taxpayer who arouses the suspicion of the IRS often is
subjected to a financial audit. His records concerning income, expendi-
tures, investments, and other matters are examined to determine
whether he has additional tax liability. But the kind of audit the IRS
performs for a section 501(c)(3) religious organization is of an entirely
118. Rev. Rul. 77-290, 1977-2 I.R.B. 26.
119. See, e.g., Myers, Vow of Poverty Ruling, 24 CATH. LAW. 221, 223 (1979); Whelan,
Critical Developments in the Vow of Poverty Area and Update on Unrelated Business, 25
CATH. LAW. 340 (1980). See also Reed, supra note 117, at 217-220 (1979).
120. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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different sort.
1 21
The object of an audit of a section 501(c)(3) religious organization
is to determine whether a religious organization is "operated exclu-
sively for religious, [or] charitable. . . purposes" and is not "carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation."'
122
This, of course, involves a deep probing into the activities of any reli-
gious organization being audited. One attorney whose firm represented
the National Council of Churches during the course of such an audit in
1970 wrote:
As to the scope of the audit, IRS said to us: "Unlike the exami-
nation of business corporations, in which the focus is primarily
upon the examination of receipts and expenditures and the deter-
mination of taxable income, the examination of exempt organiza-
tions, because compliance with the conditions of their exemption
must be verified, requires an audit of virtually all the organiza-
tion's activities, including its records, evidences of programs,
publications, and personnel functions." In other words, they
were stating that there was virtually nothing in terms of the Na-
tional Council's records and functions which was outside the
scope of the audit .... "I
On the strength of his experience concerning the audit of the National
Council of Churches, the attorney also concluded that not only does
the IRS claim the right to audit the religious activities of churches, but
it "apparently claims the right to apply its own concepts of what consti-
121. To qualify under § 501(c)(3) an organization must pass both an "organizational"
and an "operational" test. See, e.g., Levy Family Tribe Found. v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 615, 618
(1978); Treas. Reg. § 1.501()(3)-l(a)(l) (1960). The "organizational" test requires that the
organization be established solely for one or more exempt purposes. But even though "reli-
gious purposes" qualify for the exemption, the regulations offer no guidelines for identifying
such purposes. The "operational" test has four parts: (I) the organization must not engage
to more than an insubstantial degree in activities that do not further exempt purposes;
(2) the organization must serve a public rather than a private purpose; (3) the organization's
net earnings must not inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders or
individuals; and (4) the organization may not be an "action" organization, ie., it may not
attempt to influence legislation by propaganda or by other means. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(c) (1960).
Although there has been a reluctance to challenge the exempt nature of the activities of
religious organizations, in two recent cases the tax court has revoked exemptions on the
ground that the religious organizations engaged in substantial activities that did not further
an exempt purpose. See Western Catholic Church v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 196 (1979) (failure to
pursue exempt purposes stated in its application for exemption held to be grounds for revo-
cation of exemption); Church in Boston v. I.R.S., 71 T.C. 102 (1978) (inability of church to
show that its program of financial grants was directed to needy was found adequate ground
for revocation of exemption).
122. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (West Supp. 1982).
123. Shaw, Tax Audits of Churches, 22 CATH. LAW. 247, 248 (1976).
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tutes religious activity."' 24 Here the "churchness" issue is raised in a
slightly different guise.
The danger posed in the section 6033 context 25 is that on the basis
of its conception of "churchness" or "church-relatedness" the IRS can
effectively redefine "church".in a way that excludes many of the tradi-
tional social welfare functions of churches from the tax concept of a
"church" or its "integrated auxiliaries." In an audit to determine if a
religious organization is being "operated exclusively for charitable pur-
poses," the IRS can exclude from the definition of church activities
many of the traditional moral activities of the church by denying their
essentially religious nature and recharacterizing them as "propa-
ganda." Churches often, as a matter of religious concern, have been
vocal in expressing their views on matters such as civil rights, peace,
and abortion. 12 6 What are questions of spiritual principle for some can
also be questions of political principle for others. Under the current
scheme of exemption, the IRS constantly must confront the related is-
sues of whether to audit a church because of its moral stands and
whether to deem "religious" the church's witnessing of moral or spiri-
tual principles. Certainly interest groups opposed to the positions of
various churches on subjects such as civil rights or peace are tempted to
try to influence the IRS to revoke the exemptions of these churches.
Indeed, it has been reported that pro-abortion groups have been exert-
ing this type of pressure on the IRS with regard to the Catholic Church
because of the Church's anti-abortion stand.
27
Perhaps the point to be made in passing is that the IRS has not
created this situation through an excess of perversity or zeal. It is obli-
gated to protect the revenues of the federal government by enforcing
the Code. Unfortunately, the IRS must work with a Code littered with
religion-based categories that it must construe and apply.
2
1
124. Id at 249, 254. Interestingly, one of the areas of activity of the National Council of
Churches that excited the-interest of the auditing agents during the fall of 1970 was the
Council's efforts for peace in Vietnam.
125. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., U.S. Roman Catholic Leaders Muster Support for Federal Legislation to
OutlawAbortion, Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1982, at B6, col. 1;Archbishop Hunthausen to Withhold
One-Half1981 Income Tax Payment in Protest Against U.S. Arms Policy, Wash. Post, Jan.
30, 1982, at B6, col. 1.
127. Shaw, supra note 123, at 248-49, 254-55.
128. Commissioner Kurtz acknowledged that religion-based categories present serious
administrative problems in his Address to the Practicing Law Institute Seventh Biennial
Conference, Tax Planning for Foundations (Jan. 9, 1978). See also Kurtz, Dfficult Defini-
tional Problems in Tax Administration: Religion and Race, 23 CATH. LAW. 301 (1978).
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IV. The Exemption Issue in the Courts
In addition to the formal and informal confrontations between
"mainstream" religious organizations and the IRS over the metes and
bounds of the religion-based classifications in the Code, the IRS and
other taxing authorities have, on occasion, denied that certain organi-
zations are "religious."
A. The Universal Life Church
In Universal Life Church v. United States, 29 the IRS opposed the
Universal Life Church's claim to exemption as a religious organization
on two grounds. First, the IRS claimed that the issuing of Honorary
Doctor of Divinity certificates was contrary to California public policy
as expressed in the California Education Code. Second, it argued that
"the ordination of ministers, the granting of church charters, and the
issuance of Honorary Doctor of Divinity certificates by [the Universal
Life Church] are substantial activities which do not further any reli-
gious purpose."'13 0  Based on both the testimony of Church officials,
some Church members, expert witnesses, and on the court's reading of
the Constitution and the relevant California statute, the court rejected
both of the arguments advanced by the IRS and ordered that taxes paid
by the Church be refunded.'
3'
At the heart of the IRS's position was an objection to the or-
daining and chartering activities of the Universal Life Church. For
example, Reverend Hensley, head of the Church, had conducted mass
ordinations of ministers. Although Reverend Hensley did not require
any payment for charters, minister's credentials, or the Honorary Doc-
tor of Divinity certificate, he did request a free-will offering. The court
rejected the claim that the granting of the honorary degree violated
public policy, citing the expert testimony of an ordained Episcopal
priest who testified that Reverend Hensley's use of the Honorary Doc-
tor of Divinity certificate as a kind of stock in trade was a widespread
practice among religious organizations.' 32 Similarly, the court rejected
129. 372 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Cal. 1974).
130. Id at 775.
131. Id at 775-76.
132. Id at 772. For a case in which a federal court found an organization not to be an
establishment of religion, see United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439 (D.D.C. 1968). In
Kuck, the Neo-American Church was viewed by the Court as a subterfuge designed to pro-
vide protection from the enforcement of laws prohibiting the ingestion of psychedelic drugs.
The court found the church seal, which had a three-eyed toad in the center with the church's
motto, "Victory Over Horseshit" across the bottom, "helpful in declining to rule that the
Church is a religion within the meaning of the First Amendment." Id at 445.
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the claim that the ordination of ministers, the chartering of churches,
and the issuance of the Honorary Doctor of Divinity certificates were
substantial activities not furthering any religious purpose. In so doing
the court wrote:
Certainly the ordination of ministers and the chartering of
churches are accepted activities of religious organizations ....
The fact that the Plaintiff distributed ministers' credentials and
Honorary Doctor of Divinity certificates is of no moment. Such
activity may be analogized to mass conversion at a typical revival
or religious crusade.'
The Universal Life Church is frequently cited as the canonical ex-
ample of a sham religious organization. This view seems to be predi-
cated on the Church's antagonism toward the exemption of religious
organizations from various forms of taxation. An advertisement for the
Universal Life Church states:
Reverend Hensley. . . doesn't believe in the tax exempt status of
churches. However, if the government is going to give a free ride
to Billy Graham and the Pope, then why not let everyone partici-
pate in thfese blessings. Furthermore, he backs up his words by
offering to defend in court the tax exempt status of his
congregations.1
34
Although the literature does express nontax-related values and pur-
poses,135 tax avoidance and the eventual abolition of tax exemptions
for religous organizations is a dominant theme.
What exactly, however, does this emphasis on taxation establish?
There is nothing incongruous in a religion having among its tenets an
objection to the tax exemptions afforded to religious organizations.
Moreover, to urge and support a course of action that would make the
system of exemptions unworkable does not demonstrate that the Uni-
versal Life Church is a fraud. Many well-known religious organiza-
tions have taken positions on public policy issues because those issues
touched upon their moral or spiritual concerns. 36 The fact that few
people view the exemption of religious organizations from taxation as
an important moral issue does not establish that no one could so be-
lieve. One's sense of the bizarre is of little use in differentiating be-
tween genuine and ersatz religions, for even the creeds of the most staid
133. Universal Life Church v. United States, 372 F. Supp. at 776.
134. REASON MAO., Mar., 1980 (ad appears on inside of magazine cover).
135. For example, honesty, humility, the brotherhood of Man, and other such traditional
values were discussed. Id
136. The National Council of Churches, for example, has in recent years not only vocally
opposed racial policies in Rhodesia and South Africa, it has also provided money to various
"liberation" groups active in or near those countries.
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religious groups contain, in the eyes of many, utterly fantastic
assertions.
The point here is not to deny the possibility that Reverend Hens-
ley might be a charlatan and his church mere/y a tax avoidance scheme.
Rather, it is to stress the difficulties inherent in reaching a judgment
about the legitimacy of a religious organization by focusing on one
that, although widely considered to be the paradigm of a religious
sham, was adjudged legitimate. From the evidence presented to the
court-Reverend Hensley's statements, expert testimony, the evidence
cited by critics of the Church, and the testimony of some of the
Church's members-there seems to be relatively little to support the
conclusion that the Universal Life Church is a fraud, at least within the
conception of religion endorsed by the Supreme Court in Seeger and-
Welsh. 137
B. The Missouri Church of Scientology
A more ominous note was struck in Missouri Church of Scientology
v. State Tax Commission.138 This case resulted from the St. Louis City
Assessor's placing of the Church on the city's ad valorem tax rolls. The
Church took the matter to the State Tax Commission ("Commission"),
claiming that it was entitled to tax-exempt status under the Missouri
Constitution and state statutes that exempt property "not held for pri-
vate or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship."'
139
The commission ruled against the Scientologists, saying:
[Wihile the appellant has some of the trappings and accouter-
ments of an organized religion, it appears to be more an applied
philosophy which has a certain religious connotation, but which
falls short of being devoted to the worshp of the Supreme Being,
which this Commission concludes is necessary for the property
owner to have its property considered exclusively for religious
worship. 140
The Church next petitioned the St. Louis Circuit Court. The court
found error in certain evidentiary rulings and in the test of exemption
employed by the Commission. 141 Nevertheless, it affirmed the denial
137. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.
138. 560 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. 1977).
139. See Mo. CONST. art. X, § 6. See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 137.100 (Vernon Supp.
1981).
140. Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n., 560 S.W.2d at 840 (emphasis
in original) (quoting from Mo. St. Tax Comm'n. Findings). See id at 845.
141. Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Religion--Belie/in the Supreme Being is a requirementfor
a tax exemptionforproperty usedexclusivelyfor religious worship, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 610,
611 (1979).
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of exemption on the ground that the Church had not demonstrated that
its property was exclusively used for religious activities.' 42 The Church
next appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court. Not only did the Mis-
souri Supreme Court affirm the denial of exempt status, but it did so
using reasoning similar to that of the Commission. 143 In reaching its
conclusion, the court found that the decision of the Commission "rests
not on the lack of exclusivity or extent of use, but on the failure to show
the character of the use as 'for religious worship."'" Moreover, the
court stated that "[t]he term religious worship in the commonly ac-
cepted sense includes as a necessary minimum a belief in the Supreme
Being of the universe." 145 The Scientologists appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, which dismissed the case for want of a substan-
tial federal question. 146 As a result of this sequence of events, Missouri
tax officials are now able to separate the "religious" sheep from the
"nonreligious" goats on the basis of whether or not the organization
involved is theistic. It is not extravagant to claim, then, that as a conse-
quence of its application of a religion-based classification, the State
Tax Commission has succeeded in establishing theism in Missouri.
C. The First Libertarian Church
First Libertarian Church v. Commissioner 47 provides a more recent
example of the problems associated with the administration of religion-
based categories. The First Libertarian Church was founded in 1975.
As an organization it was an outgrowth of the Libertarian Supper Club
of Los Angeles, which had been founded some three years earlier. The
142. Id
143. See Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n., 560 S.W.2d at 842-44.
144. Id at 840 (emphasis in original).
145. Id The Missouri Supreme Court had distinguished Seeger, stating that Seeger in-
volved statutory construction rather than "declaring a constitutional standard circumscrib-
ing state action in the field of tax exemption." Id at 842.
Interestingly, in Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C.
Cir. 1969), the government did not challenge the bona fides of the Church of Scientology as
a religion. The case involved the seizure and destruction by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, of several electrical instruments ("E-meters") and a large quantity of literature, "as
'devices' with accompanying 'false and misleading labeling' subject to condemnation under
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act." Id at 1148. The Scientologists argued that the case
against the Church constituted religious persecution and thus violated the First Amendment.
The court found that the appellants had made out a prima facie case that Scientology is a
religion. More specifically, the court wrote, "mhe fact that [Scientology] postulates no deity
in the conventional sense does not preclude its status as a religion." Id at 1160 (citing
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Colum-
bia, 249 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).
146. Missouri Church of Scientology v. State Tax Comm'n, 439 U.S. 803 (1978).
147. 74 T.C. 396 (1980).
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Church apparently resulted from the efforts of several club members
who had come to realize that no existing denomination was based upon
"the 'community of spirit, belief and interest that had developed
among some of those who had been attending those [Club] meet-
ings.' ""4 The central doctrine of the Church was "ethical egoism" or
"voluntarism," which, in part, "encompasses the idea that the individ-
ual has a right to live his own life, for his own sake, and in accordance
with his own convictions, and without coercion from outside
sources."' 49 In addition to holding Church meetings, the Church also
sponsored suppers, club meetings, a newsletter, "noncoercive" arbitra-
tion of disputes, and a civil rights council.' 50 From the Church's
founding until April 1976, club and Church meetings were held jointly.
Thereafter, Church meetings preceded club suppers.
Shortly after its inception, the Church applied for an exemption
under section 501(c)(3). In denying the application, the IRS relied on
three related claims: (1) the Church's operations were indistinguish-
able from those of an "action" organization; (2) the Church had not
established that it was organized and operated for religious purposes;
and (3) the Church did not establish that its purposes and activities
were those of a church. 15
The tax court characterized the issue before it as being whether the
Church was operated "exclusively" for religious purposes, that is,
whether it was not operated to more than an insubstantial degree for
nonreligious purposes. The tax court found that the newsletter and the
club meetings sponsored by the Church were "substantial" activities of
the Church that were "nonreligious to more than an insubstantial de-
gree."' 52 According to the court, the club meetings were
primarily social/political events having predominately social and
political content and purpose. . . . The religious aspects of such
conclaves seem. . . indistinct. . . . We are not convinced that
the Church meetings were not in reality merely an extension of
the club meetings without any substantive change in content or
purpose. Certainly, there is no indication that the primary activ-
ity of the evening was to develop and further the doctrine of ethi-
cal egoism, even if we assume that such a doctrine can be said to
have the place in the lives of libertarians filled by God in those
creeds admittedly exempt. . ..
148. Id at 403-04.
149. Id at 399.
150. Id. at 402.
151. Id
152. Id at 405.
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Similar reasoning applies to petitioner's publication of the
newsletter .... 153
The tax court's holding depended critically upon the finding that
the club meetings and the newsletter were more than "insubstantially
nonreligious." As evidence of the nonreligious nature of the club and,
by extension, the newsletter, the court stated, "The types of discussion
at the various meetings were not necessarily religious. They ranged, for
example, from a discussion of President Kennedy's assassination, to
voluntarist philosophy, to libertarian political topics."' 54 The tax court
also placed weight on the social content of the club meetings. The
court's remark that it suspected that the Church meetings were an ex-
tension of the club meetings was presumably meant to express the view
that the Church meetings themselves might be "more than insubstan-
tially nonreligious" as a result of being closely connected with the club
meetings. These remarks unfortunately reveal the inadequacy of the
tax court's analysis, not the nonreligious nature of the Church or the
activities that it sponsored.
From the standpoint of a traditionalist conception of religion, the
tax court's characterization of club meetings as "more than insubstan-
tially nonreligious" on the basis of the subjects discussed is probably
justifiable. No doubt God was not mentioned during any of them. But
a traditional conception of religion is not the legal standard. Rather,
Seeger has come to stand for the proposition that the test of religiosity
is functional;' 55 namely, the beliefs in question must occupy the same
place in the mind of the believer as does the "orthodox belief in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption."'156 Although it is ambigu-
ous, the phrase "the same place in the mind of the believer" should
roughly be interpreted as requiring that the beliefs in question form the
foundation for an individual's moral code or outlook. Certainly, the
Church's doctrine of voluntarism performs precisely this function for
those who accept it.
If Seeger is the appropriate guide, then the tax court's list of topics
proves nothing against the Church. First, for the court to say that the
discussions at the club were not "necessarily" religious, and to attempt
153. Id at 404-05.
154. Id at 401.
155. Although Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), like Welch, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), was decided
on the basis of statutory construction rather than on constitutional demands, the IRS views
Seeger as compelling a "functional" test. See, e.g., IRS MANUAL Supp. 7 (10) G-37, at 5.
For a further discussion of this point, see also Note, Toward a Constitutional Defiition of
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1063-66 (1978). The author of this note argues that the
result in Seeger was constitutionally compelled.
156. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
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to buttress this claim with a list of specific topics, simply shows that the
tax court looked to content rather thanfunction as its standard of religi-
osity. In fact, even though the court made a fleeting reference to Seeger
at the end of its opinion, it did not provide a functional analysis of the
issues before it. Had the court been thinking along "functional" lines,
it is unlikely that it would have included "voluntarist philosophy" in its
list of nonreligious topics, inasmuch as it constitutes the Church's pri-
mary religious doctrine.
The inclusion of "libertarian political topics" in the list is further
evidence of the court's failure to think in "functional' terms. Religion,
like politics, is concerned with values. As government at all levels ex-
pands its sphere of influence, more and more issues concerning values
become "politicized." Surely it cannot be claimed that once a contro-
versial matter becomes an object of political action or debate, it there-
fore ceases to be of ethical or religious significance. It would be
palpably absurd to argue, for example, that Quaker services, where the
topics of discussion were capital punishment and the Vietnam War,
were "more than insubstantially nonreligious" by virtue of the political
significance of the topics. Since voluntarist philosophy rejects conven-
tional notions and manifestations of government as coercive and un-
ethical, it is not surprising that many of the subjects of moral concern
to the Church members were also "political" topics. 15
7
In addition to demonstrating a certain obliviousness as to the func-
tional analysis demanded by Seeger, the tax court also displayed a pe-
culiarly ascetic conception of religious organizations when it pointed
disapprovingly to the social aspects of the Church-sponsored suppers
and club meetings. 158 Only someone to whom religious organizations
are rather foreign could fail to know that many church activities are
also social activities. Churches often sponsor church socials, suppers,
Christian fellowship meetings, lectures, hospital visits, bingo games,
and many other functions. That exempt religious organizations engage
in such social activities is even a matter of record. In overturning a
157. Even the inclusion of the subject of the Kennedy assassination in the list provided
no support for the tax court's position. Whether a discussion of the assassination is relig-
iously significant depends on the use to which the subject is being put. Virtually anyone
who attended a church or a synagogue following President Kennedy's assassination, or who
has attended religious services on the anniversary of the assassination, knows that it was and
is discussed, often as part of a sermon. For some denominations, no doubt, the assassination
illustrates "man's inherent sinfulness" and his need for "redemption." So too for "ethical
egoists" the assassination could serve as a means of illustrating certain facets of Church
doctrine. But the tax court made no attempt at such a functional analysis, and as a result
established nothing by mentioning the assassination as a topic of club discussions.
158. 74 T.C. at 400-01.
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lower court's denial of a property tax exemption to a secular humanist
group in Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,'59 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals accepted a finding that
[thirteen] other churches in Oakland, admittedly entitled to tax
exemption, conducted in the tax exempt property discussions of
topics of current political and economic interest and held social
gatherings, as well as authorizing on the property meetings auxil-
iary to such churches, and occasionally permitted outside organi-
zations to use the tax exempt property for social gatherings,
discussion groups, and lectures.'
D. Current Problems
Universal Life Church, Missouri Church of Scientology, and First
Libertarian Church show the burden that religion-based categories in
tax statutes impose upon the courts. They also suggest that such cate-
gories invite governmental discrimination against novel or unpopular
religious groups. Not least of all, they indicate that some courts will
indulge in the opportunity afforded by religion-based categories to ex-
159. 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957). The functional standard used in Seeger,
380 U.S. at 176, was taken from this opinion.
160. Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d at 679-80, 315
P.2d at 398. The exemptions referred to are exemptions from property taxes, but it is virtu-
ally certain that the 13 Oakland churches mentioned were also exempt from federal taxes.
As a final matter concerning Libertarian Church, the tax court saw something suspect in
the close relationship between the Church and the club. Indeed, the Court seemed to sug-
gest that if an organization was once secular, it remains forever so. But consider the follow-
ing case:
Suppose a group of nonreligious individuals form a Bible discussion group out of inter-
est in Christian philosophy, doctrine, and history. Suppose also that their activities include
reading the Bible and secondary sources discussing the Bible, and listening to talks about
topics relating to the Bible, its teachings and its history. Because it is convenient, or because
it promotes the cohesion of the group, they also have dinner together just before their meet-
ings. Finally, assume that in the course of their studies they discover that they have come to
accept a version of Christianity. Since their views are in important ways unlike those of
existing denominations, they decide that their religious beliefs would be best served by form-
ing their own church. They do so, and continue their Bible discussion sessions as a church-
sponsored activity. Because they are a small, poor group they decide to hold their church
services before their usual supper and discussion session.
Such a scenario is not implausible, and there is certainly nothing sinister in the way the
new denomination evolved and chose to conduct its activities. What is most important to
note, however, is the substantive change in the nature of the discussion sessions. Early in
their existence they were clearly secular. But after the change in religious outlook of the
participants, the Bible discussions were obviously a form of religious activity, in spite of the
fact that the overt content of the activity was unchanged. What was decisive in transforming
the nature of. the sessions was the change in the beliefs and attitudes of the participants.
Thus, it should be clear that the club meetings, though once secular, may legitimately be
regarded a religious activity as its members developed their religious views.
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press narrow conceptions of religion and hostility toward certain reli-
gious organizations.
The potential for such discrimination is also open to the Internal
Revenue Service, which has developed a set of criteria that effectively
"require[s] a religious organization to be a highly developed denomina-
tion before it can qualify as a church."'16 1 This has the detrimental ef-
fect of denying tax exemption to new, small churches while "ignor[ing]
the structural complexity of the established denominations." 162
Although it is instructive to focus on the Internal Revenue Code,
religion-based categories have been present in areas of the law as di-
verse as unemployment and military conscription statutes. 163 More-
over, the problems of categorization are, to a large extent, common to
all situations in which local, state, or federal authorities must adminis-
ter religion-based categories.'" Generally speaking, those called upon
161. Whelan, supra note 91, at 925. The criteria that have been developed are: "(1) a
distinct legal existence, (2) a recognized creed and form of worship, (3) a definite and dis-
tinct ecclesiastical government, (4) a formal code of doctrine and discipline, (5) a distinct
religious history, (6) a membership not associated with any [other] church or denomination,
(7) a complete organization of ordained ministers ministering to their congregations and
selected after completing prescribed courses of study, (8) a literature of its own, (9) estab-
lished places of worship, (10) regular congregations, (11) regular religious services, (12) Sun-
day schools for the religious instruction of the young, and (13) schools for the preparation of
its ministers." B. HOPKINS & J. MYERS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 87
(1975). Generally, an organization need not satisfy all of the criteria in order to qualify. Cf.
Note, supra note 141, at 621.
With respect to the Internal Revenue Code, Professor Whelan points out some of the
difficulties encountered in its application:
"[T]he Internal Revenue Service must... make day-by-day determinations (for vari-
ous tax purposes) of whether a particular religious organization is a church or not. Over the
last twenty years the National Office of the Service has developed a set of criteria for an-
swering this question. To one familiar with religious and tax developments in the last
twenty years, these criteria seem based much more on the Service's defensive tactical policy
than on empirical and traditional concepts of churches. In effect, the criteria require a reli-
gious organization to be a highly developed denomination before it can qualify as a church.
There are two difficulties with this requirement. It tends to eliminate new, small churches
from the tax treatment that large, established denominations receive; and it ignores the
structural complexity of the established denominations themselves." Whelan, supra note 91,
at 925 (footnotes omitted).
162. Whelan, supra note 91, at 925.
163. See supra note 10.
164. See, e.g., Theriault v. Silber, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1977), which grew out of a
refusal of prison officials to recognize the "Church of the New Song" as a religion. While it
is possible that the prison officials had deep theological reasons for their position, one sus-
pects that the prison officials were engaging in a bit of what Professor Whelan calls "defen-
sive tactical policy," Whelan, supra note 91, at 925, since members of the religion would be
entitled to certain liberties if it were recognized as a religion. The power tofd practices,
beliefs, and organizations "religious" also raises problems. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F.
Supp. 1284 (D.NJ. 1977).
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to apply such categories are unlikely to have any expertise in making
the kinds of distinctions that are required. In addition, because reli-
gious organizations often enjoy partial or total exemption from the au-
thority of governmental bodies, such bodies must frequently view
claims to religious status as a threat to the carrying out of their respec-
tive governmental roles. But most importantly, use of religion-based
categories invites discrimination against unorthodox and unpopular
religious groups.
1 65
Beyond these considerations, however, there is the issue of Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine. As should be apparent by now, religion-
based categories cause government to become involved pervasively and
continuously with the most fundamental aspects of religion. In light of
the kinds of decisionmaking and auditing procedures required to use
and enforce religion-based categories, Chief Justice Burger's concern in
Walz that eliminating property tax exemptions for churches would
lead to a greater degree of entanglement because of the need for tax
valuations of church property and the possibility of tax liens and fore-
closures seems strikingly misplaced. If we were to take the "entangle-
ment" test seriously, the creation and use of religion-based categories
by local, state, and federal legislative bodies, agencies, boards, and of-
fices would have no place in our scheme of constitutional government.
165. The Hare Krishna sect, the Unification Church, and the Church of Scientology are
perhaps the largest and most well-known of such groups, but there are many others. Mem-
bers of such groups have often suffered more than verbal and legal harrassment. Kidnap-
ping, for example, has not been uncommon. See, e.g., Parent-Child Conflict on Religion Now
Touches Variety of Groups, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1978, at 24, col. 1.
After the Jonestown mass suicide and murders, open hostility towards nontraditional
religious figures and organizations increased greatly. See, e.g., Moon Church Seeks U.S.
Inquiry on Fire at Group ' Upstate Camp, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1980, § I at 20, col. I; Denver
Hare Krishnas Sue Christian 'Truth Squad', N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1979, § 1 at 30, col. 6
(Pentecostals were allegedly following Hare Krishnas through airport calling them "poor
brainwashed dupes"); Aide to Rep. Ryan Warns U.S. on Cults, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1979, at
B6, col. 1; School that Banned Long Hair Now in Dispute Over Banned Book, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1979, at 7, col. 2; Some in Congress Seek Inquiries in Cult Activities, N.Y. Times, Jan.
22, 1979, at Al, col. 2. For an example of the willingness of legislatures and other elective
bodies to enact constitutionally doubtful legislation to curb "cults," see Communities Finding
it Difficult to Curb Soliciting by Some Sects, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1979, at D8, col. I; Albany
Panel to Weigh Bill on Cult-Member Guardians, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1981, at B2, col. 5. As
an example of the sort of rationalizations offered on behalf of such legislation, see Delgado,
Investigating Cults, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1978, at A23, col. 2. A blueprint for a campaign of
governmental harassment against "cults" is provided by Rudin & Rudin, Countering the
Cults, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1980, at A35, col. I.
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Conclusion
If the creation and use of religion-based categories by the non-
judicial branches of government were held to offend the Establishment
Clause, what would be the consequences? While legislative bodies, ad-
ministrative agencies, and other governmental organs at all levels of
government would no longer be empowered to enact laws and regula-
tions containing religion-based categories, or to decide what is or is not
a religion, the question of what constitutes a religion would still fall to
the judiciary. This is inescapable since the courts must interpret and
apply the First Amendment religion clauses. Thus the judiciary would,
for example, have to examine even facially neutral statutes when they
were challenged, to insure that no clever legislator or bureaucrat has
included in his legislation or regulation a "definite description" that
refers as uniquely to a specific religious organization or group of reli-
gious organizations as "the author of Waverly" refers uniquely to Sir
Walter Scott.'66 But by channeling this function and by ridding our
legislation and regulations of religion-based categories, we should be
better able both to achieve equality of treatment of religious organiza-
tions and to scrutinze the exercise of the power to decide what consti-
tutes a religion.
The doctrinal consequences of the proposed change are somewhat
unclear. Certainly the entanglement test would operate to require that
statutes be facially neutral. What is more difficult is to specify how the
new entanglement test would interact with the secular purpose and sec-
ular effect tests, since interpreting the entanglement test as requiring
facial neutrality does not logically entail abandonment of the secular
purpose and secular effect tests.
In general, it seems that there are three basic approaches to refor-
mulating Establishment Clause doctrine that would be compatible with
a requirement of facial neutrality: (1) The current three-prong Estab-
lishment Clause test could be replaced by a requirement of facial neu-
trality, with judicial scrutiny being limited to insuring that the
legislation or regulations being examined do not contain impermissible
"definite descriptions"; (2) facial neutrality could supplant the current
test but with a higher level of scrutiny-thus, facially neutral statutes
might be struck down if, in spite of their neutrality, they were to violate
166. See Russell, On Denoting, XIV MIND 479 (1905). See also B. RUSSELL, INTRODUC-
TION TO MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY 167-80 (1919). No position is taken here concerning
how "religion" should be defined for the purposes of the First Amendment. For a discus-
sion of the problem of defining "religion" within the context of the religion clauses, see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (1978).
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some additional standard of "entanglement"; (3) the secular purpose
and secular effect tests could be combined with an entanglement test
consisting of the requirement of facial neutrality along with some spec-
ified level of judicial scrutiny.
This author prefers the first of these approaches for the reformula-
tion of Establishment Clause doctrine.16 Not only would this ap-
proach provide a principled basis for deciding cases under the
Establishment Clause, and thereby end the current ad hoc style of Es-
tablishment Clause analysis (of which Professor Kurland so justly com-
plains), 6 ' but it would also better advance the values of separation of
church and state by insuring equal treatment of religious organizations,
and governmental neutrality towards religious organizations.
Even though this recommendation is in substance similar to one
put forward by Professor Kurland almost twenty years ago,169 there are
clear differences between the two. First, Professor Kurland's propo-
sal-that classification in terms of religion be prohibited if designed
either to benefit or impose a burden-was offered as a doctrinal formu-
lation interpreting both religion clauses. This author grounds such a
prohibition in the entanglement test of Establishment Clause doctrine
alone. In addition, unlike Professor Kurland's proposal, this approach
has the advantage of leaving the body of Free Exercise Clause doctrine
intact.170 As a consequence, religious organizations and their members
would continue to be constitutionally protected against even facially
167. A very different approach to reformulating entanglement doctrine from the one ad-
vocated in this article is provided in Serritella, Tangling With Entanglement: Toward a Con-
stitutional Evaluation of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1981).
Serritella proposes a "factor analysis" according to which entanglement questions would be
decided in light of three considerations: (1) The religious nature of the activity that gives
rise to the church-state contacts, (2) the frequency and effect of the contacts, and (3) the
governmental interest at stake. Id at 144, 153-62.
168. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
169. Kurland first presented this proposal in his article, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1961). He presented his thoughts on the matter in a
slightly revised form in his work, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1962).
170. Professor Kurland states that "[t]he principle tendered is a simple one. The freedom
and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot
utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as
they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to
impose a burden. This test is meant to provide a starting point for the solution to problems
brought before the Court, not a mechanical answer to them." Id at 96 (emphasis added).
He apparently means to replace Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause doctrines
rather than to supplement them.
The fact that Professor Kurland's proposal would simply do away with the protections
afforded by Free Exercise Clause doctrine has been viewed by others as a liability. See, e.g.,
Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding oReligion Under the
if'rstA-mendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805, 807-09 (1978).
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neutral legislation and regulations that unduly burden the exercise of
their beliefs.' 7'
If religion-based categories are unconstitutional per se, then as a
corollary, so are tax exemptions granted specifically to religious organi-
zations. Of course, adopting the view of "entanglement" suggested in
this article would not necessarily end the exemption of church property
and income from taxation. For example, federal, state, and local gov-
ernments would be free to exempt some or all nonprofit organizations
from taxation so long as religion-based categories are not used. Simi-
larly, state governments might be able to grant or withhold financial
assistance to parochial schools so long as it is the result of a policy of
assisting or withholding assistance from private education in general.
Because on a practical level the effects of prohibiting religion-based
categories are largely indeterminate, the suggested construction of the
entanglement test would not necessarily affect any particular burden or
benefit that at present accrues to religious organizations through
church-state interaction. 72 But it would deny myriads of legislators,
bureaucrats, and government officials the role of acting as arbiters of
what constitutes a religion.
73
171. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
172. Congress and the state legislatures have broad discretion in drawing tax classifica-
tions. See Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
173. A lengthy discussion of the current teaching of the Supreme Court on the meaning
of "religion" in the Constitution is set forth in Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution:
A Classification Problem, 11 VAL. U.L. REV. 163 (1977). One writer approaches the Sisy-
phean task of defining "religion" by suggesting that "religion" be given a different interpre-
tation in the Free Exercise Clause than that given it in the Establishment Clause. Note,
Towarda ConstitutionalDefnition ofReligion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978). Reflections on
the appropriate constitutional interpretation of "religion" can also be found in Merel, supra
note 170, and Boyan, Defning Religion in Operational and Insttutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 479 (1968).

